Conventional wisdom holds that the Anti-Federalists wanted representative bodies to mirror the electorate, and that the Federalists envisioned representation as a device for refining and enlarging popular views. This characterization is accurate in a broad sense, but it overlooks an important element in Anti-Federalist thought. I argue that certain key Anti-Federalists, in particular the Federal Farmer and Melancton Smith, synthesized the "mirroring" ideal and the "refining" ideal into a theory of representation that incorporated the best features of each system. This hybrid theory, though overwhelmed in the ratification debates of 1787-88, nevertheless provides a creative alternative model for effective national union.
INTRODUCTION
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Virginia ratifying convention put it.
14 When the idea of "permanent common interest" is interpreted correctly, George Mason argued, it should encompass a broad range of people: "Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens [?] " 15 An expanded suffrage would give most people-and thus most interests-an opportunity to influence public policy. This stance was not radically different from the corresponding Federalist position, but it serves to emphasize the greater importance to many AntiFederalists of the actual representation of all major interests.
Other implications of the Anti-Federalist argument are somewhat less appealing.
Because the Anti-Federalists were devoted to the representation of interests, they tended to envision government on a smaller scale than did their rivals. Where there is a wide diversity of "manners, sentiments, and interests," Brutus argued, "there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and the representatives of one part will be continually striving against those of the other." A republic should be small and homogeneous, so that the representatives of various classes and interests can seek productive compromises and inspire the "confidence, respect, and affection of the people."
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In a polity the size of the United States, the Anti-Federalists argued, it would be impossible to represent all relevant interests and still have effective governance. More 9 specifically, they opposed any plan for national union that would entrust powers of internal police and taxation to an elected body incapable of knowing the needs of particular local communities. As Cato asked the readers of the New York Journal, " [C] an it be asserted with truth, that six men can be a complete and full representation of the numbers and various orders of the people in this state?" 17 Brutus and the Federal Farmer worried that the smallness of the House of Representatives would effectively exclude the middling sorts, while John DeWitt went so far as to name the House of Representatives the "Assistant Aristocratical Branch."
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A truly adequate representation-that is, one as representative as the state legislatures-would be far too unwieldy, in the Anti-Federalists' opinion. A better solution would be to let the states handle internal affairs, and confine the national government to certain objects of undeniably common concern, such as making war.
Although the Anti-Federalists usually conceded that requisitions were inefficient, they maintained that a dual system of direct taxation would do much more harm to republican liberty.
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17 Cato, Letter V, in ibid., 2.6.38. 18 Brutus, Essay IV, in ibid., 2.9.46; The Federal Farmer, Letter III, in ibid., 2.8.25; John DeWitt, Essay III, in ibid., 4.3.14. 19 The Federal Farmer, Letters III and XII, in Storing, ed., The Complete AntiFederalist, 2.8.27, 2.8.158; George Mason, Speech of June 4, 1788, in Elliot, ed., Debates, 3: 31; and Melancton Smith, Speech of June 27, 1788, in Elliot, ed., Debates, 2:
332-337.
Even if it were logistically possible to have a national representation adequate for the purpose of internal taxation, the Anti-Federalists argued, the legislature would still be open to corruption. As further safeguards, they advocated shorter terms and rotation in office for Senators, and annual elections for House members. As Cato, quoting Demosthenes, wrote, the "one common bulwark" against tyranny is distrust. 20 If a constituency misjudges its representative's character and dispositions, many harms may occur before they can replace him.
THE FEDERALIST RESPONSE
The Federalist Papers were the most systematic response to these concerns.
Writing as Publius, Hamilton, Madison, and John Jay laid out a case for a strong national union run by officials who would be elected by the people, to be sure, but largely insulated from their whims. While Publius' general argument is familiar, certain of his points deserve reexamination here.
Two qualifications are necessary before continuing. First, although Publius' essays were the best sustained work advanced in favor of the constitution, Publius was hardly alone in urging ratification. The virtues of the representative, then, must be associated with the filtering and elevating process the Federalists place at the core of their system. In Jay's opinion, the legislature should be composed of "the best men in the country," possessing a "general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications." Representatives, Madison wrote, should be those who "possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society." Such outstanding citizens, operating within appropriate institutional boundaries, could mediate between conflicting interests and produce policies "more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose." After all, Hamilton noted, although the people "commonly intend the Public Good," they do not always "reason right about the means of likely possess the character and integrity necessary for exercising their duties. In addition, they will tend to be grateful to their constituents for having elected them, and will be reluctant to betray them. Moreover, their pride and vanity will impede any inclination to destroy the system that gave them such great honors. If all else fails, the "vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America" will preserve the union from fatal harm."
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Madison admitted these checks might be insufficient "to control the caprice and wickedness of men," but insisted that anything more restrictive would undermine republican liberty:
What are we to say to the men who profess the most flaming zeal for republican government, yet boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose their own
rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to them?
While there is a "degree of depravity" in mankind that must be closely guarded, Madison argued, fear of it should not blind us to humanity's favorable qualities. Republican government depends on the existence and recognition of those qualities-even among leaders. Our distrust can, as Cato wrote, be the chief obstacle to tyranny, but Madison reminds us that immoderate distrust implies that "there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another." With this final argument about electoral responsibility, Madison nailed shut the Federalist case against small republics and actual representation.
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Madison makes clear in Federalist 10 that we should not always expect enlightened statesmen at the helm. The primary goal of the constitution is to provide stability and order to popular government, not encourage virtue. However, as we have seen elsewhere in The Federalist Papers, Madison and Hamilton argue that the system goes beyond ensuring peace; it subtly guides leaders toward virtuous actions without destroying liberty. Consequently, while virtuous statesmen may not always head the government, they often will-and they will enjoy the support not only of other virtuous statesmen, but also of lesser politicians, whose actions are constrained into the path of virtue.
Although many factors contributed to the Federalists' victories in the ratifying conventions, a crucial reason for their success is that they had a better argument than most of their opponents, and were able to express themselves more clearly and forcefully.
The Federalist vision of a large, diverse republic with an energetic national government was, to most people, ultimately more compelling than the pure Anti-Federalist The hybrid representative also satisfies Federalist concerns. He is not merely selected at random from among his constituents. Rather, he is their best man-the person most qualified to speak on their behalf. Not only does he know his constituents intimately, having lived among them as one of them, but he rises above them in talent and foresight. To say that he would speak reliably on behalf of his constituents would be to
give him too little credit, for he knows his constituents better than they do. When the Farmer wrote that each class must have its "centinel" in the government, his choice of 45 I see no reason why the hybrid theory could not be extended to include wellqualified women in the category of "best-informed" people. However, for reasons of clarity and historical accuracy, I retain the masculine usage here.
words was apt. This new type of representative, like a centinel, is both similar and dissimilar to his "constituency." The centinel is selected from among a body of soldiers who are like him, and who all share the same interest (security from surprise attacks).
However, the centinel is distinguished from his comrades by his unusually good vantage point. He is able to spot danger at a distance, and can sound the alarm in time to save his fellows. A smart unit will place alert, skillful soldiers on sentry duty during dicey times;
mere rotation in office, though egalitarian, is hardly most effective in such situations.
So it is with the "best informed" man. He is a little more enlightened and cosmopolitan than his constituents, perhaps because of his upbringing, his education, long experience, or an innate wisdom. Smith and the Farmer are understandably reluctant to specify exactly what makes a person "well informed" or "substantial," given their sensitivity to the diversity of human interests. In general, however, one could say that the best-informed man will have the knowledge, integrity, and skill to operate successfully in a sphere of action wider than that of his constituents. In this respect, the best informed man is immune to Hamilton's criticism of ordinary citizens, for he is comfortable interacting with people "beyond the circle of his neighbors and acquaintances." By slightly distancing himself from his constituents' constricted culture and mindset, the best informed man improves his ability to defend them from unjust encroachments, and to arrange for collective action with other interests' best informed men. He sees farther and more clearly than his constituents, can identify threats to liberty before they materialize, and can distinguish between what is in his electors' short-term and long-term interest.
The best informed man can legitimately oppose his constituents, as long as he sincerely believes himself to be protecting their true interests. A simple appeal to the "common good" is insufficient grounds for resisting popular sentiment, for a representative must also show how that which is to the common advantage is also to the advantage of his particular constituents-a task for which the hybrid representative is uniquely suited.
Consequently, the Federal Farmer and Melancton Smith do not entirely reject the natural aristocracy's claim to rule. In fact, both look to place government in the hands of competent, meritorious citizens. However, they constrain the natural aristocracy by insisting that merit must be tightly linked to interest-that candidates for office, no matter how brilliant, must be bound to their constituents by ties of sympathy. In other words, while education, political skill, eloquence, and wisdom are all attributes a hopeful candidate should possess, they nevertheless are insufficient without a direct tie to a constituency. Smith made this clear to his fellow convention delegates:
The knowledge necessary for the representative of a free people not only comprehends extensive political and commercial information, such as is acquired by men of refined education, who have leisure to attain to high degrees of improvement, but it should also comprehend that kind of acquaintance with the common concerns and occupations of the people, which men of the middling class of life are, in general, more competent to than those of a superior class.
This means, of course, that it is unlikely that the most meritorious (those who exceed everyone in ability) will always be entrusted with power. However, the best informed bricklayers and the best informed farmers, while lacking the brilliance of Jay and Hamilton, will nonetheless be more competent than the average bricklayer or farmerand able to represent their constituents in an enlightened, responsible way.
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In the New York convention, Chancellor Livingston claimed that Smith would discard the natural aristocracy in favor of "other classes of men," including "the rogue and the robber [,] . . . the poor, the blind, and the lame"-in other words, all those classes which lack virtue or capability. Smith for his supposedly hypocritical stance toward the natural aristocracy, Smith found no shame in exceeding his constituents in ability and experience. In fact, he considered his abilities all the more valuable to his constituents because a common sympathy bound him to them; without that tie, he would be the sort of drone-like natural aristocrat he criticized in his speeches. In the end, Smith basically conceded Livingston's point that natural aristocrats are everywhere, but went on to show how some aristocrats are more compatible with democracy than others: that is, those whose virtue arises within the bounds of a close attachment to a particular constituency.
Among modern politicians, Bill Clinton, "The Man from Hope," seems to approximate this ideal of representation. His extraordinary ability to identify and empathize with voters, combined with his foresight and political skill, inspired among his supporters an unusual level of confidence. Despite a string of scandals that severely tarnished his image, Clinton consistently received high marks for his public service.
People both identified with him (he could "feel" their pain) and looked up to him (he appeared to be extraordinarily competent). They trusted him not to betray their interests-trusted him, it seems, more implicitly than most elected officials. The great irony of Bill Clinton's life is that he was simultaneously one of our least trusted presidents (because of his lawyerly evasions) and one of our most trusted presidents (because of his capable, responsible leadership).
Clinton presents a paradox that is difficult to resolve without reference to the hybrid theory of representation: namely, that a scandal-wracked president continued to receive glowing praise for his job performance. One might argue that Clinton's appeal with voters stemmed from the fact that he was, so to speak, a "redneck" Rhodes Scholar.
Had he been just a "good ol' boy" from Arkansas, it is unlikely he would have been taken seriously as a governor and presidential candidate. Had he been merely a member of the political power elite, though, ordinary people would have lost interest in him. 52 What preserved him throughout his time in office was the fact that he gave voters leadership that was both enlightened and genuinely informed by the concerns of middle-and lowerclass Americans.
Were we to imagine a Congress full of Bill Clintons, each drawn from a particular Many hybrid representatives will be more moderate than their constituents, due to their more diverse experiences. However, the central criterion of leadership under the hybrid theory is that representatives be able to advocate their constituents' cause effectively, while remaining bound to them by ties of sympathy. Sometimes moderation is the best way to achieve such an end, but often more radical methods are required. Both 
CONCLUSION
Few people wish to be represented by someone so impartial as to take no interest in their special concerns. Generally speaking, constituents prefer not strict impartiality in their leaders, but rather an enlightened partiality-the sort of partiality that prevents a representative from betraying his constituents, without overly limiting his effectiveness as an independent-minded legislator.
In this context, the best candidates are those who, while competent and enlightened, never lose touch with their roots. Political consultants realize the appeal of such candidates, and hundreds of campaign commercials follow the same basic script: The Federalists would still be skeptical of the hybrid theory, since in their eyes it would lead to outcomes contrary to the general interest. The best-informed men, like other Anti-Federalist representatives, begin by advocating their constituents' particular positions, not by divining the common good. Where everyone is bound to a partial position, the Federalists would argue, the deliberative journey toward consensus will be littered with obstacles, and will likely meet with failure. Better to articulate a vision of the whole that gives structure to societal interests, than to hope that a coherent vision will arise from pluralist conflict. Richard C. Sinopoli expresses a similar concern, worrying that the Anti-Federalist representative will not be "disposed to look after the rights and interests of persons he does not know personally," and that he will shift his constituents'
share of the "costs of cooperation" to "relative strangers." The hybrid theory of representation provides a useful critical standard for evaluating schemes of reform, and a mechanism (a representation composed of bestinformed men) for filtering out plans that require sacrificing certain interests to the "common good." At the same time, though, the hybrid theory provides the impetus for genuine reform, since the best-informed men subject local interests to critical examination in the context of the wider spheres in which they operate. Melancton
Smith's abrupt decision to change sides and support ratification of the constitution is a perfect example of how a hybrid representative can lead his constituents out of narrow or 54 Richard C. Sinopoli, "Liberalism and Political Allegiance in Anti-Federalist ill-informed views. Far from being an act of disloyalty to his electors, Smith's reversal was motivated by changing political circumstances, including news of New Hampshire's ratification. Since his constituents could be confident that they would think as he would, given full information, Smith could risk making the switch.
The Anti-Federalists understood that the long-range common good is identical with the long-range good (expansively defined) of every person and group within the social contract. If the tangible and intangible benefits of association do not outweigh the sacrifices required of certain members of society, those members could be seen as acting irrationally (i.e., they would be contributing more than they could expect to receive in the long term). Consequently, the most accurate way to determine the common good is to figure out the true interests (not just the stated preferences) of each constituency-a task for which the hybrid representative is well suited. When a mutually beneficial result is achieved, a conception of the common good is likely to arise that is more genuine than the top-down formulation the Federalists prefer, for it would more reliably take each interest into account. It will also tend to inspire a sober, legitimate patriotism, as society members come to realize the short-term and/or long-term benefits of association.
Alexander Hamilton never quite grasped this idea of the Anti-Federalists. When
Melancton Smith argued that "the true interest of the state is the interest of the whole,"
Hamilton replied that "the interests of a state have no connection with the Constitution, and may be, in a thousand instances, constitutionally sacrificed." A day earlier, Hamilton had argued that "the local interests of a state ought, in every case, to give way to the interests of the Union; for when a sacrifice or one or the other is necessary, the former becomes only an apparent partial interest, and should yield, on the principle that the small good ought never to oppose the great one." To Anti-Federalists like Smith, such a choice between local and national interests was a false one.
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One could argue that Lincoln's decision to prioritize national unity over emancipation, despite strong abolitionist sentiment among his supporters, is better understood in terms of the hybrid theory, not Hamilton's doctrine of national supremacy.
Far from being a situation in which the interests of abolitionists were sacrificed to some "national" interest, Lincoln's case for the union depended in great part upon the assumption that all would be better off united than divided. In his first Inaugural Address, for example, Lincoln not only enumerated the advantages of preserving the existing constitutional order, but stressed the intangible harm that would be done by prematurely breaking apart the union. Lincoln compares the costs of secession to the emotional damage divorce causes to husbands and wives, and pleads with his auditors to remember "the mystic chords of memory" that bind all Americans together. Abolition and secession strive for clean breaks, where no clean breaks are possible. As someone with an abiding commitment to ending slavery, yet with a deeper sense than his supporters for the unintended consequences of radical change, Lincoln exemplified the hybrid approach to representation. One advantage of the hybrid system is that it is not necessarily at odds with strong national government and a relatively small representation. Unlike more radical AntiFederalists, Smith and the Farmer were not opposed in principle to a large, centralized federal republic, provided its legislature was adequately representative (Smith's own objections to the constitution were largely satisfied in the end). The hybrid system, to become effective, might require only modest changes to the institutional status quo. The hybrid theory of representation does demand, however, that policies and institutions-in particular at the national level, where representatives are most distant from the peoplebe consistent with the long-term interests of all concerned parties.
That said, the hybrid system would seem to work best where districts are reasonably homogeneous and the representative and constituents can identify with each other's life experiences. The more heterogeneous the district, the greater the apparent challenge for a hybrid representative. The pressure would be toward articulating and defending independent positions on issues, rather than demonstrating a "oneness" with the constituency. 57 The representative would be forced into a more Burkean role, focusing on the national interest primarily, and only secondarily on constituents' particular interests.
However, the necessity for homogeneity under the hybrid theory should not be exaggerated. A certain variety of experiences is necessary for leaders to become "best informed"; a community that is hostile to dissent and innovation will impede production 
